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Abstract:
Reading the moral philosophy of Iris Murdoch alongside film enables us to see
Murdoch’s notions of practical moral good in action. For Murdoch, moral
philosophy can be seen as “a more systematic and reflective extension of what
ordinary moral agents are continually doing”. Murdoch can help us further by her
consideration of the value of a moral fable: does a morally important fable always
imply universal rules? And how do we decide whether a fable is morally important?
By bringing Murdoch and Margaret (Kenneth Lonergan, 2011) together in an
exploration of the moral decision making of the film’s protagonist and our
assessment of her choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally
important fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative.
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Iris Murdoch is primarily concerned with questions of moral philosophy
and what it is to be good. Murdoch is known more widely as a novelist,
and in popular culture as a woman who suffered from Alzheimer’s
Disease as recorded in her husband John Bayley’s memoirs and embodied
by Kate Winslet and Judi Dench in Richard Eyre’s film Iris from 2001
(Bolton, 2015). But Murdoch was also a philosopher, thinking about
concepts such as attention, vision and the inner life. These modes of
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thinking were not fashionable at the University of Oxford in the 1940s and
50s, with its linguistic analytic philosophers such as G.E. Moore and
Bertrand Russell, and indeed Murdoch’s metaphysics were also not taken
up by as many future generations of philosophers as might have been
expected.1 Because of this, as well as other factors the consideration of
which are outside the remit of this article, Murdoch has often been seen as
somewhat of an outsider, with her philosophical credentials called into
question. There are, however, a few monographs that examine specific
aspects of Murdoch’s thinking (Antonaccio, 2000; Laverty, 2007;
Widdows, 2005) and a couple of edited collections that analyse her
philosophical work (Broakes, 2012; Rowe & Horner, 2010), and which
demonstrate the impact and significance of her thinking in relation to
debates in ethics and moral philosophy. The majority of the studies of her
philosophy consider her novels as integral to Murdoch’s philosophical
worldview, and examine how philosophical and conceptual themes
feature in the narratives and character arcs of these stories. It is evident
that these fictional worlds and events enable Murdoch to demonstrate her
concern with the particularity of moral life rather than the abstract
linguistic puzzles and universal moral models which occupied her
contemporaries in the British analytic scene. Murdoch’s philosophical
writings, however, merit understanding as a body of work in themselves,
without needing to draw on the novels as ballast or exemplification.
As texts, these philosophical writings are rigorous and exacting,
profoundly humane and meticulously argued, and – of exciting
relevance and potential for film philosophers – full of visual metaphors.
The concept of attention, and the language of vision and the patient
regard of art, are central to Murdoch’s discussion of how art can
fulfil a role in the development of an individual moral vision. This
article will demonstrate how Murdoch’s philosophical concepts and
language resonate with film; in particular how the discussion of the
complexity of moral issues in everyday life can enrich our understanding
of the moral obstacle course that is Kenneth Lonergan’s film Margaret
(2011).
Murdoch’s moral philosophy is concerned with the individual and with
individual consciousness. She is opposed to the idea that morality is
something that can be decided upon in isolation from the real world
and the real people in it. For Murdoch, moral philosophy can be seen as
“a more systematic and reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents
1. Justin Broakes considers reasons for this in his introduction (2014, pp. 17–21).
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are continually doing” (1956/1997, p. 83). This is similar to the view of
philosophical thinking expressed by Stanley Cavell in “The Thought of
Movies” (1995), where he writes about philosophy:
I understand it as a willingness to think not about something other than
what ordinary human beings think about, but rather to learn to think
undistractedly about things that ordinary human beings cannot help
thinking about, or anyway cannot help having occur to them, sometimes in
fantasy, sometimes as a flash across a landscape. (p. 17)
Cavell considers these things to include “whether good or bad are
relative” (p. 17), and that “such thoughts are instances of that
characteristic human willingness to allow questions for itself which it
cannot answer with satisfaction” (p. 17). These things and thoughts are
the concern of Murdoch in the deliberation of her moral humanism, and
of protagonist Lisa, played by Anna Paquin, in Margaret, as she traverses a
moral minefield which challenges her adolescent moral certainties and
exposes the need for the consideration of others in the construction of
a moral life. Cavell’s call for thinking undistractedly is met in some way,
and exceeded in others, by Murdoch’s proposed approach of “loving
attention”, which Lonergan’s film compels us to pay to Lisa’s moral
conflicts.
Murdoch argues that facts in relation to moral concepts are decided
upon within the framework of the individual consciousness of the moral
being. So “morality is bound up with our deepest conceptual attitudes and
sensibilities about the world, which determine the facts from the very
beginning” (Antonaccio, 2000, p. 38). As Murdoch writes, “we differ not
only because we select different objects out of the same world, but because
we see different worlds” (1956/1997, p. 82). And seeing our moral
world – the world of values which define our choices – is “the prime
task of the individual moral agent” (Blum, 2014, p. 307). The idea of
seeing different worlds, and the ways in which Murdoch describes this,
offer a link to the way in which films can offer visions of worlds in which
moral journeys take place. Not simply their narrative arcs, but as
transformative moral experiences: for the characters within the diegesis,
clearly, but also for us as we experience the film; and, more than simply
inviting us to observe similarities with our own lives, film can really
provoke and stimulate our moral thinking. As Thomas Wartenberg
says, film can “allow us to see the complexity of our moral lives in
a manner that allows us to more fully grasp morally significant aspects
of it” (2007, p. 98). This is the approach developed by Robert
Sinnerbrink, in that he proposes we view film as a “medium of ethical
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experience, with a transformative potential to sharpen our moral
perception, challenge our beliefs through experiential means, and thus
enhance our understanding of moral-social complexity” (2016, p. 4). As
the “major art” that Murdoch (1956/2016) considers it can be, film
enables the loving attention and the individual moral work that Murdoch
calls for. In this article, I will explore the resonance between film and
Murdoch’s thoughts in one particular paper from 1956, “Vision and
Choice in Morality”, drawing upon Murdoch’s analysis of moral vision in
my analysis of the moral agency of Lisa in Margaret, and extend this to
consider the relationship that we have with the film world and with the
wider world in which we live.
Lisa, Lonergan, and Margaret
Margaret was filmed in 2005, but not released until 2011 due to “a brutal
and bitter editing process” (Lovell, 2012), and various disputes between
Lonergan, the studio, Fox Searchlight, and the producers (Gardner, 2014).
It was originally written by Lonergan as a three-hour film, cut into
three versions (including one by Martin Scorsese), and finally allowed
into cinemas as a two and a half hour cut in 2011, with the final and
the extended cut becoming available on DVD in 2012. The film’s
post-production difficulties have become notorious, not least because
Scorsese became involved as financier, Lonergan’s supporter and potential
witness. For Lonergan, it was his long anticipated follow up to You Can
Count on Me (2000), which had explored the depressing consistency of
disappointing family dynamics in an insightful award-winning drama.
Lonergan’s third film as writer and director is Manchester by the Sea
(2017), which met with awards season success and critical acclaim.
Lonergan is a highly regarded and not very prolific filmmaker, and
Margaret is considered by some critics – and apparently Scorsese – to be a
masterpiece (Gardner, 2014; Emerson, 2012; Lovell, 2012). Not many
people found it an easy ride. Joel Lovell of the New York Times described
it as “a big, messy, problematic film” (2012). Peter Bradshaw of
The Guardian called it “a sprawling neurotic nightmare of urban
catastrophe” (2011). Many critics and bloggers refer to the film as being
operatic, and this impression is justifiably founded on the highly charged
emotions of the central character, Lisa, and the soundtrack arias from
La Traviata and Don Giovanni. At one point, a bereaved, exhausted and
furious character confronts Lisa with the reality that, “this isn’t an opera:
and we are not supporting characters in the fascinating story of your
own life!”
Lisa wrestles with the dramas and demands of being a teenager with
divorced parents, living in New York City and going to an exclusive high
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school where she is seen engaging with fellow eloquent and intelligent
classmates in debates about contemporary global politics and the role
of America in a post-9/11 world. Her absentee father (played by Lonergan
himself) is promising a horse riding holiday, and Lisa is determined to
have a cowboy hat to wear on the trip. Her hunt for suitable headgear
leads her to seek the attention of a bus driver, driving a bus, who is
wearing such a hat. As their flirtatious banter plays out, a woman on a
pedestrian crossing is hit by the bus. Lisa holds the injured woman during
the last minutes of her life, coming face-to-face with the imminence
and immediacy of death. The rest of the film is concerned with how
Lisa resumes life after this incident: the decisions she makes to tell
certain untruths, her pursuit of particular people in order to resolve her
confused and conflicted feelings, and the volatile, self-centred maelstrom
of emotion that surrounds her. The film explores Lisa’s attempts to make
good choices, and the reasons why her choices might be considered
to be bad.
Following the accident, Lisa is traumatised, but tries to carry on with
life, going for a date at the cinema but unable to sit through the film. That
same night her mother Joan (J. Smith Cameron), a stage actress, receives
flowers from an admirer, and a romance begins which naturally occupies
Joan’s mental and physical attention. As Lisa walks along the street the
next day, she is shown in slow motion, as if to convey how the world is a
different place today and she is moving at a different pace. She resignedly
pushes her way through a group of harassing boys, but a close-up shot of
her face from the side, and of her head from behind, accompanied by the
overture from Lohengrin, concentrates on her slowed passage through
the same streets that she walked along yesterday, but now as an altered
person.
As life goes on around her, Lisa’s relationship with her mother becomes
fraught and bad tempered. She arranges to lose her virginity to a
classmate, and the encounter is unremarkable in terms of passion or
pleasure but notable in that the boy ejaculates before he has put on the
condom which he had promised to use. Seemingly unable to regain peace
of mind, Lisa goes to visit Maretti (Mark Ruffalo), the driver of the bus
that hit the pedestrian. Lisa has tracked him down and, despite having said
initially to the police that the driver was not at fault, she is now seeking
what she perceives to be a more honest account of the accident. In doing
so, Lisa confronts the realities and complexities of the issues surrounding
seeking acknowledgement from the bus driver about what she considers
“really happened”. The film has given us an experience of the lead-up to
the accident that accords with her view. Lisa runs alongside the bus, trying
to engage the driver’s attention, and he responds to her and teases her,
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repeatedly taking his eyes off the road in front of him. He does skip the red
light. Their flirtatious encounter has resulted in the woman being killed.
The death scene is traumatic and distressing to experience as a viewer.
As Lisa holds the woman in her arms, we and Lisa realise that parts of the
woman’s body are left under the bus and in the middle of the road, that
she has no chance of survival, but is not yet dead. We are confronted with
a vision of the last moments of life, and they seem to take an age. The
woman speaks: she asks if her eyes are open or closed; she mistakes Lisa
for her daughter; she is filled with panic and confusion. The impact of the
idea that one might not know if one’s eyes are open or closed as one dies is
profound and significant: we are confronted with the idea that we might
not be able to know what is actually going on. Others may be more aware
of our dwindling life than we are. The woman dies in her arms, and
Lisa clings to her, unable to accept the passing away of the woman she is
holding. Lonergan says of the scene:
That single incident drives the entire film and drives the entire journey of
Anna Paquin’s character, and it’s a long film. And I knew that if that
accident wasn’t extremely awful – as awful as humanly possible – then
there’d be no movie. You don’t see any flashbacks of it. It’s got to stay in
your mind the way it stays in the character’s mind. (2012)
Here the filmmaker describes a very acute instance of the necessity for
an incident on-screen to have a lasting effect on the viewer. At this, the
film succeeds. The impact of witnessing this death creates a gut-wrenching
connection with the magnitude of Lisa’s situation, and an appreciation
of the intensity of her predicament, and that of the driver, at the scene of
the accident. On the spot, when interviewed by the police, the urge to
cover-up their innocent but reckless complicity in the accident is
excruciatingly acute. Looks are exchanged between them. The dread
and fear on the driver’s face is there for us and Lisa to read. Was the light
red or not? Was it the pedestrian’s fault or the driver’s? It hangs on Lisa’s
word as the police officer asks “was the traffic light red, yellow, or green?”
Lisa replies, “I guess it was green.”
Later in the film, when we set off on the journey with Lisa in her
operatic bubble of personal quest and understanding, we believe that it
might be a good idea for her to speak to him to help her ease this
nightmarish guilt and pain she is suffering. Like Lisa, we also have not
seen the driver since the day of the accident, and we hope that there
might be some connection and consolation for them both. But as Lisa’s
journey progresses, the film conveys a shift in perspective: we enter
the Italian district, we see a family preparing for a wedding to begin,
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we see the stars and stripes hanging from several houses, and we see the
driver’s house. When we arrive, we see a woman answer the door and we
realise he has a wife. A glistening gold crucifix hangs over the wife’s
shoulder, dominating the doorway in which she stands. The operatic
soundtrack ceases: instead we hear his children fighting, and Lisa is
admitted into his home. As the expression on Maretti’s face at the sight of
Lisa is both flabbergasted and terrified, we realise what he has to
lose, what he has been through, and what the ramifications for him might
be – both in that family living room and in light of the wider institutions
and networks that govern their lives: the law, his employers, his marriage,
his family, his church. We, like Lisa, falter. We too have been seduced by
her quest and her shifting perspective from cover-up to search for truth:
but this has been Lisa-centric. We begin to realise that she cannot operate
in a vacuum, or on her own uninterrupted trajectory of self-righteousness.
Maretti has a very real stake in this drama too, arguably far more real
and immediate than her moral one. As her desire to obtain recognition
from him persists, his tone becomes angry: he wants her phone number;
he has been dealing with the fallout for him and his life. He asserts
the words of the tribunal, that the brakes worked in accordance with
“the physical limits of the machine”, and that “there was no criminality
found”. We start to think that perhaps she needs to leave him alone.
Our appreciation of the rights and wrongs of this situation, which was
already uneasy due to the circumstances of the accident, is now
confounded. He is not the lone single unit free to flirt and think only of
what Lisa wants him to. We now experience a concern for the driver’s
wellbeing, and that of his wife and children, and the moral quest for the
“truth” about the accident to come out has become less clear. In his anger
he shouts at her, “you’re gonna go home and do your homework and
who’s gonna look after my family?” For Lisa, however, his refusal to go
along with the version of events she now seeks to assert leads her to
pursue the path of legal recourse by contacting the dead woman’s family
and friends, and encouraging proceedings to be brought against the bus
company, with the aim of ensuring the bus driver loses his job. Lisa
had a set idea of the right thing to do, to seek a more truthful account
of the cause of the accident according to her view, and to get some
acknowledgement from Maretti that her view of things is correct.
However, this short sharp sequence slaps Lisa in the face with another
person’s life, and a set of reasons why he is not willing or able to go along
with her wishes.
This is the way the film works: to discombobulate us, alongside Lisa.
It challenges our expectations of the story world at the same time as it
challenges Lisa’s about the way in which her world works. Lonergan has
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stated that he wanted to make a film about the way teenagers transition
into an adult world, realising that life is about transience and death.
The film is called Margaret after a poem called “Spring and Fall” by
Gerard Manley Hopkins, which Lisa and her classmates study in class. The
poem is about a young girl’s realisation that the passing of things is sad; in
the poem this is the fall of leaves from a tree and the onset of autumn. The
poet observes that the girl is realising the sadness of death and will come
to understand mortality and loss:
Margaret, are you grieving
Over Goldengrove unleaving?
Leaves like the things of man, you
With your fresh thoughts care for, can you?
Ah! as the heart grows older
It will come to such sights colder
By and by, nor spare a sigh
Though worlds of wanwood leafmeal lie;
And yet you will weep and know why.
Now no matter, child, the name:
Sorrow’s springs are the same.
Nor mouth had, no nor mind, expressed
What heart heard of, ghost guessed:
It is the blight man was born for,
It is Margaret you mourn for.
Lisa’s teacher John (Matthew Broderick) reads the poem to her class. Lisa
does not seem to be following the poem in the book, unlike her classmate,
and we cannot tell whether she is listening to her teacher’s reading, taking
the words to heart and being moved by them, or is in a world of her own,
pondering her meeting with Maretti and disclosures of her feelings of guilt
to the dead woman’s friend. At the end of the poem, John asks the class,
“Any thoughts?” There is no reply from the class, and John turns to Lisa
and asks her specifically. As he says her name, with an upward intonation,
Lisa looks up at him, eyes wet with tears, and the scene ends abruptly and
cuts to a shot of a taxi which is taking Lisa to the police station in order
for her to amend her statement to reflect what she now wants to say
happened. The police are not impressed by this volte-face, and legal
process, bureaucracy, and the inconvenience of others obstruct her path
from now on.
The film, then, is partly the telling of Lisa’s existential lightning bolt and
her realisation that the world around her is too tired or resistant to bother
with her concern about the truth, as older hearts around her “come to
such sights colder”, and do not even “spare a sigh”. But it also works as
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an obstacle course of moral reasoning and analysis for us, and it is here
where I turn to the philosophy of Iris Murdoch.
Murdoch and the Moral Fable
Philosophically concerned with goodness and the role of the inner life in
conceptions of morality, Murdoch was writing philosophical texts from
1951 to 1997. She published the first book on Sartre in England in 1953 at
the age of twenty-four. She frequently pitted herself against the British
philosophical establishment, challenging the British empiricists such as
Russell and Ryle, and pursuing Plato, inspired by Simone Weil.2 In this
article I am concentrating on a paper she gave to the Aristotelian Society
and which was published in their proceedings in 1956, entitled “Vision
and Choice in Morality”.3 Here, Murdoch is teasing out the position of
her contemporary moral philosophers, or “the ‘current view’” as she
calls it (p. 77), and where they locate the material for their moral
philosophy, “observing where and in what way moral judgements may be
involved, and then to consider the relations between the selected
phenomena and the philosophical technique used to describe them.”
(p. 76). Under objective models, “since [G.E.] Moore”, she finds
that questions such as “what is my morality?” and “what is morality as
such?” are addressed by descriptions of choices expressed in specific
language. “On this view”, she says, “the moral life of the individual is
a series of overt choices which take place in a series of specifiable
situations” (p. 77): moral concepts are “roughly an objective definition
of a certain area of activity plus a recommendation or prohibition” (p. 77).
As Murdoch writes, “the charms of this view are obvious. It displays
the moral agent as rational and responsible and also as free; he moves
unhindered against a background of facts and can alter the descriptive
meaning of his moral words at will” (p. 77). This is achieved through the
linguistic method,
which provides a meaning for moral words which eschews earlier errors
and construes these words as nearly as possible on the model of empirical
terms, giving them definite factual criteria of application, and without
reference to transcendent entities or states of consciousness. Morality can
then be shown to be rational after its own fashion […] (p. 78)
2. For an overview of Murdoch’s philosophical work and the complex reasons behind her
influence and legacy, see Broakes (2014).
3. This paper, along with all of her most influential essays and shorter philosophical
pieces, is reproduced in the collection Existentialists and Mystics assembled by
Peter Conradi (1997).
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For Murdoch, however, this objectivity is a problem. Murdoch is
concerned with what she calls the “inner life”, and she asks what place
this should have in a philosophical analysis of morality. She defines the
“inner life” as meaning “in the sense of personal attitudes and visions
which do not obviously take the form of choice-guiding arguments”
(p. 80). When thinking about what a person “is like”, Murdoch argues,
we do not consider only their solutions to specifiable practical problems,
we consider something more elusive which may be called their total vision
of life, as shown in their mode of speech or silence, their choice of words,
their assessment of others, their conception of their own lives, what they
think attractive or praiseworthy, what they think funny: in short the
configurations of their thought which show continually in their reactions
and conversation. (pp. 80–81)
This is a challenge to the behaviourists of the day, and to those who seek
to impose rigid certainty in abstract, ignoring the particularities and
specificities of human beings. Murdoch anticipates their objection as
she investigates “what technique is suitable to the analysis of such
material” (p. 81). She asks us to consider “moral being as self-reflection
or complex attitudes to life which are continuously displayed and
elaborated in overt and inward speech but are not separable temporarily
into situations” (p. 81). A term like “good” cannot have the simple
empirical meaning, Murdoch argues, as “red”; reducing it as such “is one
result of assuming that moral philosophy can be made linguistic simply by
putting “good” into inverted commas” (p. 82). There are more complex
regions that lie outside of actions and choices, and we need to attend to
these areas or visions, which we may not always be able to understand or
appreciate immediately. These regions “may show openly or privately as
difference of story or metaphor or as differences of moral vocabulary
betokening different ranges and ramifications of moral concept” (p. 82).
In this way, we can see how moral philosophy is “a more systematic and
reflective extension of what ordinary moral agents are continually doing”
(p. 83). This humane analysis allows for difference but also credits us all
with a complexity of vision that takes into account our visual and
metaphorical experiences, memories, impressions and desires. This leads
to the question, in this film-philosophical context, of how the viewer of
Margaret responds to, predicts, and processes Lisa’s journey in line with
their/our own moral vision, informed as it is by our experiences,
resentments, values, and ideals. Murdoch’s discussion, of how moral
insight differs from moral performance, links clearly with Lisa’s situation
in Margaret. Lisa comes to see how a moral life is far more complex than a
judgement based on whether one traffic light was red or not. Even though
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the ramifications of this may be far reaching, they differ for different
people and they cannot be dictated by one objective act. It is not as simple
as that her decision to lie was wrong and her decision to come clean is
right. This is quite a difficult path to assert, as there is a familiar generic
and cinematic quest for truth which is tightly bound up with objective
behaviourist morality. But Lonergan’s film world confounds such
simplistic moral judgement, so that Lisa’s moral maze can be seen as
creating a filmic moral philosophy along the lines Murdoch describes:
a vision of the self-reflection Lisa has to experience in order to come by
her own vision of a moral world. This moral world is created by what
happens to her and what she chooses to do, but far more than this, it is
also affected by the behaviour, choices, problems, conversations and
happenstances that circulate around her and spin off in different
directions. The film conveys this through unfinished conversations,
snippets of overheard dialogue, unresolved ambiguities and unsatisfactory
non-conclusions. Whether it is a lawyer on his mobile phone discussing a
bail application for a client, two elderly ladies discussing the benefit of
having an ugly dog that nobody will steal, or the boy who is in love with
Lisa, Darren (John Gallagher Jr.), breaking down in tears alone in his
bedroom when she has abruptly ended their phone call, the film shows us
snippets of the particularities of people’s lives in their quotidian
magnitude.
Again Murdoch helps us, as she moves on to consider the contrast – such
as it may be – between art and morals. For Murdoch, “a moral agent may
explore a situation imaginatively and in detail and frame a highly specific
maxim to cover it, which may nevertheless be offered as a universal rule”
(p. 87). So, an imagined tale and set of circumstances could lead to a
conclusion and a judgement upon an action which could be offered as a
universal rule. This would suggest that the experience of watching – or
experiencing – a film such as Margaret could well be sufficiently
universalisable to satisfy the more behaviourist moral philosophers
among us. This is perhaps more applicable to the idea of natural justice
so often at the heart of Hollywood westerns or thrillers: those who act
unselfishly in certain recognisable circumstances are likely to prevail and be
rewarded. However, some other films that suggest a significant moral
dilemma as the fulcrum of the film, such as The Box (Richard Kelly, 2009),
may turn out to be purely decorative in that the consequences of the moral
choice play out as fantastic or exaggeratedly far-fetched.4
4. For a review that appreciates the lack of ethical complexity of The Box see Peter
Bradshaw (2009).
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Murdoch does not seek to underplay the requirement for judgements,
choices and action. After all, she concedes, it could be argued that
“one can meditate and explore the mysteriousness and inexhaustibility of
the world, but meanwhile one has continually to make judgements on the
basis of what one thinks one knows, and these, if moral, will claim to be
universal” (p. 87). But Murdoch resists this desirability for universality.
Not only is it unrealistic to expect the “universal rules” model to fit every
particular circumstance, but Murdoch sees no point in trying to make it
do so. And it is in the reflection and consideration of the backgrounds to
our choices, that we can learn. Murdoch argues, “why should we blot out
as irrelevant the different background of these choices” (p. 88), which
may be made confidently or tentatively? In Murdoch’s view, attending to
the details and inexhaustibility of them may well induce humility and an
expression of love, rather than induce a paralysis of which to be afraid.
And, she argues, due to the difficulties of describing in language the
inexhaustible particularities that occur pursuant to this approach, that this
attempt to understand needs to be done in ways other than in language.
She considers the limitations of language when it comes to serving us
creatively, and that “the task of moral philosophers has been to extend, as
poets may extend, the limits of the language, and enable it to illuminate
regions of reality which were formerly dark” (p. 90). The attempt to
impose moral rules, she suggests, is a way of securing us against
ambiguity, but not only is this not always achievable, it is also not
necessarily desirable. Here is where parables and stories might be moral
guides, but these too may be ambiguous or paradoxical. They might be
open to continual reinterpretation, and provide sources of inspiration
which highly specific rules could not give: it is in the story, with its
ambiguities and paradoxes, that what we might call a moral way of
thinking, or a moral vision, can be developed. Calling for “a fresh vision
which may be derived from a ‘story ’”, or “a sustaining concept which is
able to deal with what is obstinately obscure”, and which “represents a
mode of understanding”, Murdoch suggests that moral freedom “looks
like a mode of reflection which we may have to achieve, and less like a
capacity to vary our choices which we have by definition” (p. 95).
The work Murdoch conducts in this essay is anti-establishment and
anti-definitional; it is in many ways anti-linguistic and anti-behaviourist.
It is at this point in her thinking, as she proposes a less rigid, more visual
and pluralist perception of moral living, that Murdoch introduces a
different philosophical approach:
This kind of imaginative exploration of the moral life is being practised by
contemporary continental philosophers, often without special metaphysical
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pretensions; and there is no reason why such exploration should be
combined with erroneous philosophical arguments. (pp. 97–98)5
Here Murdoch is departing from “the current view” and indicating a
different way of conceptualising, philosophically, ethics and morals, in
which they demand exploration and analysis, rather than “pure formula”
(p. 98). Experiencing the long, tormented and disturbing three hours of
Margaret creates, I suggest, a fresh vision derived from a story, but also
from the very cinematic telling of that story. To return to the scene where
Lisa visits Maretti, it is the sight of the wife and the sound of the children
that convey the bus driver’s home situation in ways that force us to make
the realisation that he has a lot at stake. The come-down from the set-up
of Lisa’s operatic quest, accompanied by “Addio del passato” from
La Traviata6 and images of post-9/11 New York, brings us sharply down to
earth too: we do not expect him to deny things as starkly as he does. We
gather from his conversation that there have been disciplinary proceedings
and no finding of guilt. In the context of the film we are unnerved by this
conversation that fails to deliver the atoning liberation Lisa craves, and
proceed to be challenged at every turn by the quandaries and frustrations
Lisa creates and confronts: befriending the dead woman’s family, seducing
her teacher, fighting with her mother, let down again by her father. The
web of individuals with their own inner lives and moral frameworks is
complex and connected, and not all through the main narrative events.
This complexity, as well as the film’s long duration and slow pace, afford
unusually multi-layered engagement with events on-screen, and the truly
traumatic early accident serves to sustain the attention required in order to
suffer the moral discombobulation that the film inflicts.
By bringing Murdoch and Margaret together in an exploration of the
moral decision making of the film’s protagonist and our assessment of her
choices, we can learn more about the idea of film as a morally important
fable rather than a fable that is purely decorative. Vitally, we do not have
to learn a universalisable lesson from watching the film. Neither do we
have to decide whether Lisa did – or did not do – the right thing at any one
point. The film thwarts our attempts to identify “the right thing” on
screen – it cannot be reduced to the red light – and instead creates a
maelstrom of people making moral decisions both tentatively and
confidently. Such decisions are made against a range of backgrounds,
5. Murdoch had published her book on Sartre in 1953, but was more heavily influenced
by the work of Simone Weil, particularly Weil’s concept of attention and its role in
ethical relationships.
6. Act III, Scene 4, “Farewell my dreams of the past”.
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many of which are suggested, without being developed, serving to stress
the multitude of moral agents with their own inner lives. As Lisa arrives at
a state of distressed but reflective realisation of the uncertainties and
brutalities of social living, then we – as distressed and hopefully reflective
participants in the film’s moral philosophy – cannot help but recognise a
moral fable that constitutes what Murdoch might call a philosophical
picture of morality (p. 98). This picture leads us not to an assertion of a
clear cut rule for what is the right thing to do in such a situation as Lisa
finds herself. Far from it; the film shows us that it is in the areas around the
action, the parts of people’s lives that this film illuminates, that moral work
is being done, and moral visions are being changed. And this in turn can
change our moral vision as spectators of Lisa’s world, and, in compelling
our attention to her moral torment, can perhaps induce contemplation of
our loss of moral fervour and outrage to resignation or apathy.
The type of picture that Murdoch considered film can present is
suggested, tantalisingly, in her short essay on the cinema which she wrote
in 1956 for British Vogue. In this, the only piece of writing with cinema as
Murdoch’s sole subject, she writes how,
the film is, for better or worse, the medium which can most exactly
reproduce the moment-to-moment vagaries of the human consciousness.
[…] a film is as near to us as our own self-awareness, and comes over us
with the inevitability of time itself. (1956/2016)
This reveals that Murdoch saw the potential for thinking about film in the
way that film philosophers do, as a medium that relates to the way in
which we think about the world in multifarious ways, and most
particularly to our individual experience of the film world and its
temporality. More particularly, and in a way that strongly suggests she
would have considered a film like Margaret as a morally important fable,
conveyed in a way that exceeds language and action, Murdoch writes
about an aspect of film she notes as unique to the medium:
There is […] one natural object with which the cinema is supremely
concerned, and that is the human body, and more especially that ‘most
interesting surface, ’ the human face. Here we can find tragedy and comedy
made minutely concrete in the movement of a muscle, and human character
on display at the point where spirit and matter are most intensely fused.
If cinema could do nothing but present faces it would have enough material
to be a major art. (1956/2016)
In Margaret, the voices, gestures and stances of Lisa and her mother
Joan are fraught with tension, anger and anxiety, but it is in the close-ups
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of their faces, which are frequent and prolonged, that we can see the
pain wrought in the movements of their twitching, stressed muscles. Joan’s
face as she sits in the waiting room while her daughter is having
an abortion, is a picture of pain, sorrow at the plight of others in the
same room, and the processing of how she and Lisa have come to be
where they are. And Lisa’s face, in the film’s closing sequence at the
opera, as she moves from her more usual position of redoubtable
combatant to a daughter who can cry and be comforted by her mother, the
process of breakdown is laid bare for us to experience, in unrelenting
temporal proximity, just as was the accident which prompted such
a tumult of experience for us all. The film as a whole, therefore, is a
Murdochian moral fable, compelling our attention and regard to the
specificities of a complex moral vision; but it is on Lisa’s face, agonisingly
wrought in her moment-to-moment journey, that this moral work
is evident.
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